ethics to foreign policy is the esamination of the phenomena of international politics. Once a few very general principles and concepts have been set out by tlie theologian or ethicist it becomes necessary to turn to the subject matter to which international cthics addresses itself, international politics, in order to make normative goals concrete and meaningful and in order to identify at least the more prominent obstacles to the infusion of ethical values into the conduct of international relations.
The study of international politics is a very broad and coniples affair. It includes the analysis of the nature of politics, the components of political power, the principal alternatives of policy in international affairs, and the limitations lvhich may reduce foreign policy clioices n.lietlier these limitations be intrinsic to the po\ver political process itself or diether they be introduced specifically for the purpose of curbing the naked interplay of power politics, e.g., international Iasv, organization, and morality.
I am not here concerned with the reasons for setting foreign policy goals, e.g., whether they be based on purely selfish, power-political goals and drives or whether they be tlie expression of a high degree of altruism. Rather I intend to esamine the means dint are available in the execution of any policy, given the ~vorld in lvhich we live. However, as suggested at tlie outset, this morally neuter analysis has deep normative implications since the means a\'ailable to international decision makers and the conditions under ivhich these means may be used obviously tend to determine the ways in nvhicli both positiire and negative etliical strictures may be obsenml in tlic practical order, Trnditionall!., the instruments of international politics Iin\~e been categorized approsimately ;IS fol10n.s: diplomacy, militu? force and economic force. To this list there \vas generally added some sort of cntcli-;ill catego? to cover sub rosa activities such n s propigaiidn. subversion, intervention in the domestic political d a i r s of another state; in short, Dr. O'Brien is Dircctor of t h e Imtitute of R'orld Polity, Georgetown Univereity.
2 icwrldvicic! -activities not formally acknowledged in the world of diplomacy. This ill-defined category has today be. come in many respects more important than the others; it is certainly as important. I shall refer to it as "politico-military coercion short of war,'' with the understanding that both the "political" and "military" components of the rubric are to be very widely construed.
To these four categories I shall add a fifth which may cause surprise: normative institutions as political instruments. The principles, rules and institutions of international law, organization and morality limit international politics but they are also instruments of politics. Indeed, on this fact must rest a good part of our hope that normative values will be honored in international relations. While one hopes that statesmen will sometimes respect normative values for their own sake one esTects that statesmen will more often respect such values because they see that it is in the enlightened self-interest of their nation.
Diplomacy
Hans hiorgenthau, perhaps the leading modern interpreter and advocate of diplomacy tells us that "Taken in its widest meaning, comprising the whole range of foreign policy, the task of diplomacy is fourfold: ( 1 ) Diplomacy must determine its objectives in the light of the power actually and potentially available for the pursuit of these objectives.
( 2 ) Diplomacy must assess the objectives of other nations and the power actually and potentially a\.ailable for the pursuit of these objectives. ( 3 ) Diplomacy must determine to what extent these different objectives are compatible w i t h each other. (4) Diplomacy must employ the means suited to the pursuit of its objectives. Failure in any one of these tasks may jeopardize the success of foreign policy and with it the peace of the world."
It is difficult, however, to distinguish these four tasks. Basically, tlus paper is only concerned with the last, the choice of means, but it appears to be impossible to disengage this subject from the other three. hlorgenthau proceeds from this categorization of the tasks of diplomacy to an analysis of what \vould appear to be our subject matter here, the Nor is the Foreign Ser\.ice the sole source of legal representation of the United States toduy. The military may \vel1 have the predominant role i n sttitus of force agreements and an AID official \\,ill often negotiate an agreement providing for complicntcd forms of assistance in exchange for even more complicated forms of internal refonn \\~hicli miSlit n~ell leave an old-fashioned diplomat gaspins. Or, in ;I very real sense, it should be pointed out that tlie political representation of the United States is no longer the sole function of our diplomatic rcprcsentatives. Neither the function of reporting facts and trends in foreign countries nor that of ehpl,iining and furthering the Amcrican point of \.ie\v is Iiniitcd to the Foreign Service. hlany agencies' represent,itives report; many, in one way or another, rcprcsent.
This fact has serious implications for the whole subject of ethics and foreign policy. The essence of morn1 responsibility is rationnl control. Ho\ve\.er, in the increasingly comples world of foreign representation, control is more and more difficult to pin doum. h n w yielded such alternnti\res ;IS iso1;ition ancl neutralit\., maintenance of balanccs of ponw by alliances andior abstention from alliances, imperialism, policies of prestige and intervention i n the internal affairs of other stiites. Since we are concerned here nlniost escliisivcly \vitli .\niericnn responsibility and American power we may reject the techniques of isolation ilntl neutrality, or neutralism out of h:ind. These are utterly uiincccptable. But alliances seem to be incvitiible for ;i great po~vcr that sceks to unite many states in tlie fnce of a supranntionnl threiit. Immedintely we encounter the clussicnl problems of effectuatins political conipromise, problems that are found in [lie United States Senate a s \\.ell as in the United ",itions Gcnern1 Asscmbly or the inner councils of NATO. The diplomacy of political compromise, in turn, means realism, the subordination of tlogmntisni of \vliatciVer kind, and staying polver. Surely it is clear tlint the diplomacy of the Free \\'orld in our time requires an objective appreciation of facts and a \villingness to compromise within reasonablc limits. But this, of course, hns its repercussions in the realm of ethics Returning, then, to traditional techniques of international politics, we may pass immediately beyond imperialism, the very mention of which would s d c e to bring unbearable censure upon the great nonCommunist powers of our day, and investigate policies of prestige and of intewention 3s instrumcnts of international politics. A policy of prestige seeks to create an impressive image of a state, regardless of its Objective power or of its objective power relntionship with another state. The rivals in the current protracted conflict are engaged, intcr alia, in i i contest for prestige which ranges from achievements in outer space through reports of educational accomplishments to the success of basketball teams. It is vital to understand tlie magnitude of this encounter. Often proponents of peace, disarmament, international organization or unilateral self-abnegation advocate "concessions" in the interest oE the particular goals they support. But one cannot divorce such concessions from the game of "one-upmanship" which inevitably results from the competing policies of prestige Ivhich the great powers must maintain. One can only mention in passing the contrast behveen the cold, reasonable calculations of the hlorgentliau variety of diplomacy and the subjective, iicnfe-racking clllculations in the "don't chicken out" ps!chology of policies of prestige in -the Cold IVar.
Cocrcion Short of War

I*
Apparently the primordial instinct of man is to settle differences, whether personal, local, national or international, by direct recourse to physical conflict. This fact has dominated international relations immemorially. Today the impulse to resort to force in order to settle disputes is confronted by the greatest limiting considerations that man has ever known. This could only be expected in an age when it is impossible to study international relations properly without mastering the rudiments of military science and military history. Having said this much, one may readily admit that Hiroshima and, indeed, the two world wars, changed the nature of war so as to alter, perhaps fundamentalIy, its status as a n instrument of international politics. The consequence, as we have seen, is that war itself in the sense of direct confrontation behveen major poti'ers in a more-or-less unlimited contest of armed force is seldom enk-isaged as anything other than a tragic failure of foreign policy. But the threat of all-out war is ever-present and "brinF;manship," however hard on the nerves, appears to be an indispensable instrument of international politics for a great power today. hIoreover, under the umbrella of the balance of terror which results from the transformation of all-out war from an instrument of policy to a mutual suicide pact there persists a strong inclination to support foreign policy by military means. This may be done in two ways which are often used simultaneously.
First, a major power may use "proxy" forces of a lesser power, as in Korea. Second, some form of limited conflict may be employed. This may take the form of conventional war, guerrilla war or wide-spread civil disorder and subversion, or some combination of all three. The essence of this kind of use of force is that it is limited to forms which are not likely to draw an all-out military reaction from the other side. The original massive retaliation concept was a brave one. It sought to cut through the a mbiguities of war by proxy and by less-than-total means and say in effect, if h,loscow challenges us seriously, no matter where or in what fashion, hloscow will risk nuclear annihilation. At Dienbienphu and many other places, some of \vhicli are probably unknown to most of us, this bold concept failed.
And with its failures, I am afraid, the issue of the "no win policy" \vas born; for what has been termed a "no win policy" is, it seems to me, inevitable in a situation wherein recourse to direct, all-out m i l i t q force is denied policy-makers escept as a final, \ir-\ V h t are the implications of tlus evolution of the role of military power for international ethics? On the one hand we may point out that the foundation of the contemporary intemational political scene is the balance of nuclear terror and that this rests squarely on the credibihty of the nuclear powws' deterrent capability. For a nuclear power unilaterally to relinquish this capability there would have to be a clear recognition that it mas capitulating its place as a great power. I a m not concerned here with the pros and cons of such a decision b u t in any analysis of military power as an instrument of international politics it is necessary to underscore the fact that the ability to deter nuclear attack by the credible threat of nuclear retaliation is a sinc qua noti of continued existence as a great power.
On the other hand, war by proxy and non-nuclear war in a great variety of forms seem also to be indispensable instruments of international politics in the age of protracted conflict, IVhatever \Vestern preferences may be, this fact is thrust upon \Vestem powers by others and their choice is, again, a narrow one behveen being prepared to retaliate in kind (or, indeed, to take the offensive in this kind of warfare) or to capitulate. All in all, then, it is clear tliilt military force, f a r from passing into oblivion in the wake of the mushroom cloud at Hiroshima, is more than ever a central element in the esecution of foreign . tually hopeless gesture.
policy.
Economic Power
Any reference to the use of economic poiver as an instrument of foreign policy brings to mind at once visions of h p p , Standard Oil, the United Fruit Company and similar giants shouldering their way to the fore in a world in which a great corporation may possess more economic power than a would-be sovereign state.
However, the implications of economic power for foreign policy have undergone some rather drastic changes. In the first place, it is probably more difficult to win political successes through the use of economic power because of tlie esistence of competitive "peaceful co-existence." There is a very strong tendency for the antagonists in the Cold IVar to come to the assistance of states which are being coerced by the other side and this tends to be true in the economic as well as in the political and military realms. Tlis in itself is not an entirely novel state oi &airs; what is novel is the "reflex-action" form that assistance to an economically endangered state takes, e.g., Egypt, Yugoslavia.
Second, the use of political or military power to defend private economic interests abroad is bccoming more and more rare. Since the first world war, the trend towards state socialism has eroded the once prevalent concept of the sanctity of private property. The risks of \ v u are such today that p nboat diplomacy in support of an oil company is virtually out of the question. h,loreover, the con&tions of competitive co-esistence in the Cold War preclude much overt support for private business abroild. The West and the Communists both jockey for the key position as the great supporter of economic and social reform in order to win friends in the new nations. In these circumstances, a statemsuch as the United States has to lean over backwards to avoid the appearance of placing private American economic interests above the people's aspirations for a minimum level of existence in one of the emerging nations.
This, in turn, leads us to another, more positive change that has occiured in the realm of economic power. It is fair to say that the motivation belihid h e r i c a n abstention from old-fashioned economic imperialism is not solely, probably not even priniiuily, the negative fear of losing ground in the Cold IVar.
There has been a moral revolution in the IVest, and above a11 in the United States. We have come to accept the proposition that ou the international as on the national or local level, the possession of economic power carries with it the responsibility to assist the less fortunate. Foreign aid, not dollar diplomacy, is the liallmark of our time.
Yet even this new, positive, altrujstic facet of economic power brings complications with it. Ultimately, foreign aid cannot seriously contribute to real economic and social progress unless it is intelligently given and intelligently received. hiore and more it becomes evident that many of the present recipients do not really know how to make the best use of the Alny 1963 5 aid that is given them. Then, it may be said, we must sliow them how. But tllis involves a very considerable inten'ention into the internal affairs of another sovereign state. Indeed, to the estent that w e are sincere in desiring to assist the underdeveloped count r y \ye may feel an obligation to make our aid contingent upon evidence of a serious effort to reform fundamental institutions. Just how this can be done reninins to be seen. It is a new and challenging problcni \vliich should occupy our thoughts much more tlian nostalgic thoughts of tlie "good old days" of United Fruit and die Marines.
Normative Institutions
-4s remarked earlier, studies of international relations usually contrast tlie instruments of international politics Lvitli the limiting institutions of international I;iu~, organization and moralih. ]\'odd opinion, althougli not an "institution," is also a limiting factor \vliicli is generally discussed. It is important to understand, however, tliat these institutions are today important political instruments. Even the most callous totalitarian poww uses normative institutions and normative concepts for its political purposes.
International law is constantly invoked-the right of ;icccss to Berlin, the illegalit). of over-flights, the legal right of the United States to retain its base at Cuantanamo, tlie cliuge of illegal use of bacteriologicnl warfare in the Korean II'ar, clinllenges to take a dispute such as that over the nationalization of the Suez Cannl company to the International Court of Tustice, protests agninst nuclear tests in the Pacific ;IS \.iolutive of the concept of freedom of tlie high seas, the immunities of diplomatic personnel and the limits of iibuse of such immunities-these are only a few of tlie subjects over u~hicli states contest in legal tcmis.
The professionally cynical first-year law student or the cocktail party pundit can elaborate many reasons ~~l i y international In\\. is not law a t all and the self-conscious protagonist of "pure poiver politics" can deprecate international law as n factor in international relations. T h e responsible statesman, l i o n w w , cannot indulge himself in this manner, at least not publicly. The fact is that there is a deeprooted con\riction in man that there ought to be some Lincl of Ian, above the arbitrar). lvills of nations. True, there is likenjse a deep-rooted disposition to kiolate or ignore that law when 3 nation's vital interests are at stake. Yet the fundamental strength of the conviction that there is and ought to be an international law is so great that even the violator of the law acknowledges it by making some kind of legal excuse, Closely related to this phenomenon is that of the more recent emergence of the conviction that there must be ; 1 global international organization devoted to maintainingworld peace. Those who d o not accept this as a fact of life cannot have an objective, comprehensive understanding OF contemporary international politics. As President Kennedy has emphasized so often in the past year, there is no question as to u-hctlicr tlie United States will participate in the activities of the United Nations. The only questions relate to how we will participate and to zuliat gooh we will seek. This is not to endorse Lvitliout q u a u c ation the UN as an institution. It is facing a fact.
However, once we are clear on the inevitability of participation in some kind of a general intemational organization, w e must analyze very critically the limits of such an organization as a n instrument of international politics. The UN has as its first function the maintenance of peace through a system of collective security. T h e system demonstrably will not work in the way that was originally planned. Our security, then, remains essentially our concern, not the UN's, and tluough imaginative use of Article 51 and Articles 52-54 the United States has managed to provide collective self-defense for itself and its allies without violating the Charter.
The UN is the focus for m s control and disarmament efforts but here again it is evident that any real progress in these fields must come as the result of the efforts and sacrifices of the major powers. Finally, the United Nations is a n institution that is supposed to settle disputes. Yet, as recent commentators have increasingly emphasized, the original image of the UN as a primarily adjudicating body has to be clianged. The UN is a rather incoherent parliamentay body. It has neither the structure nor the underlying unity for the temper of a quasijudicial institution.
There remain two other sources of limitation on international politics, international morality and world public opinion. Neither are "institutions" in the sense that international law and organization are institutions, nor are they potentially "instruments" of international politics in the same way that diplomacy, military force and economic power are instmments. Yet they are sources of political gain and loss, as well as sources of normative and political limitation on the conduct of international politics. Statesmen and whole nations, acting like men, not merely "political men," do have a concern for international morality and for world opinion. If w e do not take this into account all of our efforts to comprehend the use of tlie instruments of international politics will be of little avail.
